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What Can We Learn from the
Misunderstandings of Radical
Constructivism?
Commentary on Slezak’s “Radical Constructivism:
Epistemology, Education and Dynamite”
Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. • Boise State University • ddykstra@boisestate.edu
> Problem • What alternative strategies from our experiences using a Piaget-based radical constructivist pedagogy
might have more and better results than the current practice of responding in debate form, each side trying to prove
the other wrong? > Method • Use of Slezak’s paper to illuminate the point that the central problem with the interpretation of RC generally used in such writing is that the authors seem not to be able to operate from the central tenet of
RC, which is the opposite of that used in realism. Description of how this failure to use the central tenet of RC results in
claims that RC is irrelevant to education and to definitions of good teaching. > Results • A specific approach shown to
be useful in facilitating the construction of new understanding in science is adapted in order to guide interaction between an RC and a realist, which can result in the realist understanding the RC point of view. > Implications • Instead
of debating with critics of RC, where each side is trying to prove the other side wrong, we need to change the interaction to one in which members of opposing sides attempt to understand the other’s position. In this situation we are in
a position to use a pedagogical strategy in which the realist examines her own fundamental assumption that we can
know a mind-independent world, and considers the implications of a starting assumption that is exactly the opposite.
> Key words • Realism, good teaching, solipsism, disequilibration, folk theory teaching.

Introduction
We have seen many criticisms of radical
constructivism (RC) in many venues from
those representing realism, objectivism, and
materialism. The paper by Peter Slezak in
this issue is a good example (Slezak 2010).
In this commentary I attempt to supplement the excellent commentary on Slezak’s
paper by Leslie Steffe (2010). Needless to
say, I wholeheartedly agree with Steffe’s lines
of reasoning. He has identified some of the
fundamental issues in these “constructivism debates” and has cogently responded to
them.
Between us, I believe Steffe and I touch
on the fundamental issues in the debate, but
not the many other finer points that might
be raised about this particular paper. Clearing the fundamental issues can tend to render some of the finer points moot. As Steffe
points out in his first paragraph, others will
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have different interpretations. We offer our
comments to illuminate the reasoning presented from a RC point of view.
In the first section, I offer some additional insight to what Steffe calls “an unjustified criticism” and offer an explanation of
why this unjustified criticism might be so
often voiced. In the second section, I address
claims typically made about RC with respect
to education based on misunderstandings
of RC. In the third section, the question,
“What is good teaching?” is addressed in
terms of a distinction between a realist view
and an RC view.

Origins of the unjustified
criticism
In the Fall of 1989, I spent the semester
at Carnegie Mellon University working with
a colleague on the first stage of a project to

construct an artificially intelligent conceptual physics tutor. My relatives live near Washington, DC, so I took the opportunity early
in the semester to drive down to visit them
and our program officer, Ray Hannapel, at
NSF in DC. Ray and I talked about various
things including the project. At one point
Ray said: “You sound like Ernst von Glasersfeld. Do you know his work?” When I replied that I was unfamiliar with von Glasersfeld’s work, Ray provided me with Ernst’s
well-known chapter, “An Introduction to
Radical Constructivism,” (Glasersfeld 1984)
in a book named The Invented Reality.
I had seen the term “constructivism” in
the publications of Rosalind Driver’s group
at Leeds. For about 10 years, I had been using Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive equilibration in my thinking about learning and
teaching physics. There was something different between how I was thinking at the
time and the details of the Leeds group dis-

Radical Constructivism

What Can We Learn from the Misunderstandings of RC? Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr.

cussion of constructivism, but I could not
clearly describe it.
I was interested to see if this “radical constructivism” of von Glasersfeld
was closer or not to how I was thinking.
I read the piece once during the weekend.
Something bothered me. I agreed with everything I was seeing in von Glasersfeld’s
chapter but one thing: it seemed he was
talking about solipsism. I could not see
how I could agree with the rest so much,
yet have it end up in solipsism. As a person
who is in physics, solipsism just does not fit
my experience. I spent several days mulling this over, rereading the chapter several
times daily. Finally on a warm afternoon
later that week, walking back from the office on campus to my apartment several
blocks away, I realized that von Glasersfeld
was not talking about solipsism. Instead he
was talking about not being able to compare directly our explanatory stories concerning our world of experience with some
independently existing world; that is, we
cannot determine the truth of such explanation or even their relative proximity to
truth, but merely determine how well they
fit the evidence of our experience.
The contradiction that I first thought
was there did not exist. Indeed, von Glasersfeld was rendering on paper what I had
begun to think about the origins and nature
of students’ conceptions of phenomena and
he was helping me fill in gaps. There was no
contradiction between my understanding
of Piaget’s ideas, of von Glasersfeld’s ideas,
and my own experience.
This little story about my first reading
of the piece on RC by von Glasersfeld and
at first thinking RC is solipsism – a denial
of the existence of an objective reality independent of our own thinking – is something I have seen repeated many times.
One can see countless examples of this in
the “constructivism debates” in all forms
of media. The first response of a materialist, realist, objectivist to a statement such
as “our knowledge can never be interpreted
as a picture or representation of that real
world” (Glasersfeld 1984: 18) is to jump to
the conclusion: if we cannot know a mindindependent reality, then there must not be
any mind-independent reality, i.e. solipsism. One can argue from the evidence that
for most such people there seem to be only

two options: either this mind-independent,
objective reality exists and we can know it,
or it does not exist and we cannot know it.1
What such a conclusion derives from is the
unquestioned notion that the result of our
mental efforts approaches a true description
of a mind-independent reality. Two physicists described this idea in the following
way:
“ …we postulate the objective existence of physical reality that can be known to our minds…with
an ever growing precision by the subtle play of
theory and experiment.” (de la Torre & Zamorano 2001: 103)

If it is possible to know this mind-independent reality then if one claims we cannot
know it, there must not be a mind-independent reality. Logically, if the first premise
is not taken, then the rest of the reasoning
does not follow, which is the position in RC.
The adherence to this first premise can be
seen to be the origin of the criticism that RC
is solipsism. Those who have not let go of
this fundamental tenet of realism are not in
a position to understand RC.
That RC has dropped this tenet, as
pointed out by von Glasersfeld in several
of the quotations from him in Slezak’s paper, constitutes a fundamental distinction
with major implications for the nature and
status of knowledge. It is clear that those
who do not understand the implications of
dropping this one assumption, that we can
know a mind-independent world, tend to
1 | We should note that this “either-or” is a
conflation of two propositions: either 1) a mindindependent reality exists and 2) we can know
that mind-independent reality or the negatives of
these two propositions. Where RC differs from
realism is that RC does not consider these conflations. It deals with the second proposition, that
we can know a mind-independent reality, and
all that this entails. Specifically, RC holds that
we should not claim we can know a mind-independent reality, because all we have is whether
or not our constructed explanations fit our experiential world. Since we hold that we cannot
know a mind-independent world, we can take no
definitive position on such a world and taking no
definitive position does not in any way hinder our
efforts to construct explanations to enable us to be
successful and survive.

gloss over this point, as we see in the paper.
One of the many results is failure to realize
what the adjective “radical” is intended to
signify:
“ von Glasersfeld (1995a) explains that radical
constructivism is ‘an unconventional approach
to the problem of knowledge and knowing’ that
‘starts from the assumption that knowledge, no
matter how it is defined, is in the heads of persons, and that the thinking subject has no alternative but to construct what he or she knows on
the basis of his or her own experience … It is
unclear why such truisms might warrant extravagant claims for being radical and revolutionary.”
(Slezak 2010: 107)

Assuming that when a person reads von
Glasersfeld where he writes that the adjective “radical” refers to “going to the root of ”
a distinction between realism and RC as to
whether one makes the same assumption as
de la Torre and Zamorano, then this is evidence that the detractors of RC may not be
doing their homework when studying RC.
Alternatively, if they have done their homework, it is also distinctly possible that, not
realizing this distinction, the detractors
make a different meaning of von Glasersfeld’s words than he intends. In short, the
adjective “radical” in RC is not intended to
refer to the ideas of “far out,” “not mainstream,” “beyond fringe” that were introduced to the meaning of radical by the
surfer culture in the U.S. back in the 1960s.
The radical in RC refers to the fact that RC
goes to its roots in the nature of knowledge.
While the physicists de la Torre and
Zamorano appear to be in the realist camp,
others are clearly not. For example, Max
Planck wrote:
“ Now there are two theorems that form together
the cardinal hinge on which the whole structure
of physical science turns. These theorems are:
(1) there is a real outer world that exists independently of our act of knowing and (2) the real outer
world is not directly knowable.” (Planck 1932: 82,
emphasis in the original)

In this passage we see one of the fathers of quantum theory seem to take the
same position on our ability to know the
real outer world as do von Glasersfeld and
Piaget.

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/1/120.dykstra
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Because I have developed and use a RC/
Piaget-based pedagogy and have been doing
so for nearly 30 years, I spend a fair amount
of time helping my students come to grips
with the nature of knowledge in such a
pedagogy. Along with the numerous “constructivism debates,” presentations at conferences, journal articles and books written
attempting to “prove” RC is wrong and bad
for people, I have watched literally several
thousand people have this same initial reaction to RC’s view of the nature of knowledge:
that RC is solipsism.
We are all so immersed in a realist, objectivist, materialist culture that, without
our being aware of it, realism has become
part of the “air we breathe.” Most in society take this realism as given, just the way
things are. For the realist, no other options
than that either the mind-independent
world exists or it does not are available. A
second taken-as-given notion in this realism
is that the explanation we develop is true or
a nearly true “picture” of a mind-independent world, with its corollary being that we
can determine which of two explanations is
closer to the truth of a mind-independent
world. These two ideas taken together make
it no surprise at all that the first reaction to
a description of RC is that RC is just solipsism. We should be surprised if this was not
the initial reaction.
Clearly, this little drama repeats itself in
RC-critical papers, as we see here in several
passages from Slezak’s paper:
“ [Von Glasersfeld] recommends: ‘Give up the requirement that knowledge represents an independent world’ (1995b: 6–7) … On a different construal, the idea that there is no mind-independent
world is undoubtedly a radical proposal.” (Slezak
2010: 103)
“ It is in keeping with his insistence on rejecting an
unknowable ontological reality to read von Glasersfeld’s remarks as Quine’s holism.” (ibid: 106)
“ They reject the external world when they evidently
wish to reject absolute, infallible truth claims. Of
course, the fallibility of our scientific knowledge
is undoubtedly an important insight but is hardly
new with radical constructivism and it is unclear
who the target may be for von Glasersfeld’s critique on this score.” (ibid: 106–107, emphasis
added)
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The resistance to letting go of the premise that we can know the mind-independent
world apparently leads critics of RC to miss
the fact that Quine, whom Slezak quotes
below, is saying essentially the same as von
Glasersfeld on the issue.

theories or the ‘veil of ideas.’ It is this repeated
emphasis on an inaccessible or unknowable reality by von Glasersfeld that warrants the repeated
charge of idealism.” (Slezak 2010: 106)

The “veil of ideas” notion is an attribution by Slezak, not one that is present in von
“ Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to inquire Glasersfeld’s work. It is interesting to notice
into the absolute correctness of a conceptual here that Slezak adds this notion of “veil of
scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standard for ideas,” not von Glasersfeld, and then uses
appraising basic changes of
this notion to brand RC
conceptual scheme must be,
as idealism.
not a realistic standard of
The realist will
It is no surprise at all that
correspondence to reality,
claim, as do de la Torre
the first reaction to a
but a pragmatic standard.”
and Zamorano (2001),
(Quine 1961: 79, quoted in
that by dint of our mendescription of RC is that
Slezak 2010: 106)
tal effort we can know
RC is just solipsism
the nature of a mind“ Von Glasersfeld’s notion of
independent
world
‘viability’ seems best underwith ever increasing
stood as a ‘coherentist’ position concerned with accuracy. Setting aside this one premise,
what he calls ‘the goal of a coherent conceptual at least temporarily in order to understand
organization of the world as we experience it’ RC, would enable the realist not to have to
(Steffe & Gale 1995: 7), and with ‘the goal of struggle to give RC labels that do not fit as
constructing as coherent a model as possible of exemplified in the previous two quotations.
the experiential world’ (ibid: 8).” (Slezak 2010: I am not suggesting that the realist must ac106)
cept abandoning the premise that we can
know the mind-independent world, merely
There is other evidence that being able that the realist suspend the premise for the
to know a mind-independent world is still purpose of understanding RC. Having set
very fundamental to the thinking of those aside the premise temporarily, the realist
against RC. Coherence and viability are will see that statements, claims, and denot interchangeable notions. The desire for scriptions made in RC truly do fit the tenets
coherence is not an idea that is claimed to of RC and its description of human knowbe unique to RC. The desire for coherence ing. Such statements, claims, and descripis common to descriptions of the devel- tions were formulated to be consistent with
opment of rational explanation from all RC. They were not formulated to be consispoints of view. Realists, objectivists and tent with realism, so it is no surprise when
materialists strive for the same thing, co- a realist points this out. Dykstra (2007) has
herence, in their practice of understanding expanded on this point in the pages of Conand developing science. What distinguish- structivist Foundations.
es RC from other views is its position that
How might we help the realist to see RC
the role of knowledge rests on its viability, as it is? The following strategy is adapted
its fit to experience, not its correspondence from one shown to be highly effective at into a mind-independent world. This substi- ducing conceptual change (Dykstra 2005).
tution of coherence for viability is another If we in RC wish to deal with this issue of
manifestation of the notion that one can this normative first response to RC, first
know a mind-independent world being we must accept that it happens and must
still central to the thinking of those who expect it to happen. If it were the case that
oppose RC.
insisting that critics are misconstruing RC
would result in them realizing what RC is,
“ Following Quine, our ontological commitments we would see different responses to our efare ipso facto the posits of our best theories and forts than we see. Insisting and telling them
have nothing to do with an inaccessible, unknow- that it is so, is as ineffective in this case as it
able reality lying beyond our experience, our is in science teaching.
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Because understanding RC requires the
individual to become aware of a fundamental
premise of realism, that we can know a mindindependent world through our thinking,
then a first step would be to engage the realist in discussion examining the fundamental
features of their beliefs. When one is unaware
of the foundations of one’s views, then one is
doomed to be a victim of these foundations,
RC or not. Once their position on the possibility of knowing a mind-independent world
by mental effort is explicit to them, then the
interaction can move to exploring the possibility of setting this position aside temporarily, which can be the object of the discussion.
This discussion will inevitably lead to considering the consequences of setting the position
aside. At this point, if the previous steps have
been carried out, the RC and the realist are in
a position to discuss the nature of knowledge
from the RC point of view as one possible
consequence of these steps.

On education
That RC is of no value to education and
the preparation of teachers is often repeated,
as we see in Slezak’s paper and in Nola’s writing as we see it quoted in the paper. The paper opens with:
“ Despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, I suggest that the ‘radical constructivism’ of von Glasersfeld is an example of fashionable but thoroughly obscure and problematic
doctrines that can have no benefit for practical
pedagogy or teacher education.” (Slezak 2010,
abstract)

Later we find:
“ Such insights are surely familiar to teachers innocent of constructivism or any other philosophy, for that matter. We will see that this stark
discrepancy between philosophical pretensions
and practical pedagogy is the consistent pattern
in constructivist writings. For example, as Nola
(1998: 33) has noted, effective teaching methods
that may be an alternative to didactivism cannot
be inferred from a non-realist philosophy of science.” (Slezak 2010: 103)
“ Fully acknowledging the distinction between
denying a mind-independent world and the claim

Type of
instruction

N

Pre-diagnostic
score

Post-diagnostic
score

Folk theory-realist1

596

1.8

3.8

Science
& Engineering

RC-Piagetian

365

1.1

9.8

Non-science
Non-engineering

Majors

Table 1: Average scores on a diagnostic of student beliefs about the relationship between
motion and force. A computed summary of data presented in Dykstra (2005). The diagnostic was developed by Thornton & Sokoloff (1998). All scores included are matched pairs, pre
and post instruction. The diagnostic is scored on a 15-point scale. The data from folk theory
instruction was collected in multiple institutions across the U.S. over a period of a dozen
years. The data from the RC-Piagetian instruction was collected at the same institutions
over 6 years.
(1) In folk theory pedagogy, teaching is the presentation of established canon by approved
methods for the benefit of the deserving (Dykstra 2005).

that we cannot know it, it remains that the relevance and bearing of these matters on education
must remain zero.” (Slezak 2010: 104)

In order to convince us of the verity of
this claim that RC can have no benefit for
practical pedagogy or teacher education,
the RC critic must logically prove the claim
or demonstrate that actual evidence collected in classrooms that applying a pedagogy developed from RC results in either
poorer, or at least no better, learning results
from the students when compared to the
majority pedagogy based in realism. But
neither is present in the paper – no data on
learning results from the classroom is cited and the same claim is repeated several
times with no proof. As such, we have no
reason to accept the claim introduced in
the abstract.
We can easily determine that the RC
critic is on thin ice with respect to such
claims about RC and education. In the
first issue of Constructivist Foundations,
evidence is presented that reveals an RC,
Piaget-based pedagogy results in change in
student understanding that is far superior
to that achieved in traditional pedagogy. In
fact the difference is so great that one does
not need statistics to see it in the data.
Table 1 shows that good folk theory
teaching (at good universities by Ph.D.
physicists assisted by graduate students
in physics using the best texts and well
equipped instructional laboratories) leaves
the science and engineering majors still

with the everyday, common sense conception that as the force changes, so changes
the velocity. This would be perfectly fine if
indeed that was the intent of the professor
and textbook author, but it is not. Yet the
very students most physics professors believe really are not capable of understanding physics demonstrate a class average
shift indicative a significant percentage being able to demonstrate in their responses
that as the net force changes, so changes
the acceleration. The difference here is the
RC-Piaget based pedagogy in contrast to
the realism-based, folk theory instruction.
With this it seems that we have no reason to accept this claim that the relevance
of RC to education is zero. We have in front
of us data collected in a careful way from
real classrooms that contradicts the claim.
The evidence also renders non sequitur any
logical argument in support of the notion
that RC can have no relevance to education. This evidence is a direct challenge to
the claim that anti-realist RC can have no
relevance or bearing on pedagogy, that it
can have no benefit for practical pedagogy,
and that effective teaching methods cannot
be derived from anti-realist RC.
Lest one leap to a conclusion not intended, the claim is not being made here
that teaching with good results is possible only through RC. What the learning
evidence cited represents is an example
repeated over many semesters at university
level that the claim that RC cannot or does
not have any value to education is false.

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/1/120.dykstra
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This question arises in assessing the
claims often made in reference to the usefulness of RC to education. Slezak writes
as if good teaching is prevalent without RC
and that much good teaching has been going on for a long time:
“ Somehow good teaching has managed to flourish despite the persistent obduracy of these [philosophical] problems.” (Slezak 2010: 103)
“ Some of my best friends are dualists and great
teachers.” (ibid: 103)
“ In the light of an undeniable history of centuries
of successful teaching, it seems clear that teachers and learners may manage effectively, even
superlatively, without knowing or caring about
psychology, much less epistemology or metaphysics.” (ibid: 109)

If good teaching results in change in understanding of the phenomena being taught
about, then the evidence is overwhelming
that such is not the case with realism-driven teaching. Evidence that such pedagogy
in science education is a spectacular failure
is massive.
The tip of this iceberg of the failure of
folk theory instruction is revealed in Dykstra (2005). In that paper a bibliography
is referenced that contains thousands of
pieces of research on students’ conceptions
in refereed publications. All of the ones that
examine the effect on students’ conceptions
in normal (folk theory) instruction reveal
the same results: essentially no change in
student understanding. Since RC critics
clearly reject the notion that a RC-driven
pedagogy can have any real relevance to
education, then one can only imagine that
“good teaching” is folk theory teaching.
Hence, we must question these claims about
good teaching and great teachers.
How might the realist, objectivist, materialist honestly be able to make such claims?
It is fairly clear that the RC critic must have
a different measure of the results of teaching. In folk theory teaching, a portion of the
established canon is presented (transmitted) to the students by approved methods.
To measure the effect of this teaching one
naturally asks the students to show what
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they have “gotten” from the presentation
by reporting it back in various ways called
for by the instructor. From the evidence of
research in student conceptions in science
referred to above, it is clear that students
can give back on exams what they have gotten from the presentations in ways that satisfy the folk theory instructor. Furthermore,
they can do this without any real effect on
the conceptions of the phenomena they had
when they came to the course. We see from
Table 1 that there is at least one pedagogy,
based in RC, that has a far more substantial effect on the understandings of students
who participate with it.
In the discussion of constructivism and
education, we find:

certain kind of performance shall be accepted as
adequate for this particular instructional context.
The gap between what passes for understanding
and genuine understanding remains great; it is
noticed only sometimes […] and even then, what
to do about it remains far from clear.
“ In speaking of ‘genuine understanding’ here, I
intend no metaphysical point …[W]hat an extensive research literature now documents, is that
even an ordinary degree of understanding is routinely missing in many, perhaps most students.
(Gardner 1991: 6, emphasis in the original)

Conclusion
I came to RC and initially made a logi-

“ As the banality of the foregoing translations cal assumption that it was about solipsism,
suggests, teaching and learning are among the which I reject. This assumption is very natnatural, intuitive mental skills that humans ural and logical, given that we grow up and
display through a tacit knowledge rather than are immersed in a realist culture. Instead
explicit theory or doctrine. In the light of an of rejecting RC, I struggled with a descripundeniable history of centuries of successful tion of it until I was able to see how it made
teaching, it seems clear
sense. That sense was not
that teachers and learners
that RC is solipsism. At
We have no reason to accept that point, I was in a pomay manage effectively,
even superlatively, withthis claim that the relevance sition to make a proper
out knowing or caring
decision about how it
of RC to education is zero
about psychology, much
works and whether I
less epistemology or metathought it was useful. I
physics. I have argued that
did not have to decide to
teacher and learner are perhaps best conceived accept it at that point, just see how it works.
on the analogy of speaker and hearer in a con- I could not really make such a decision to
versation.” (Slezak 2010: 109)
accept or not accept RC until I could under-

In particular, the passage “an undeniable
history of centuries of successful teaching”
is explicit evidence that the view of good
teaching is apparently what was described
above as folk theory (realism)-driven teaching, which is demonstrably a spectacular
failure at inducing change in understanding, at least as described in physics and
mathematics education research and other
educational settings.
For example Howard Gardner, not a science educator, points out the problem:
“ If you answer questions on a multiple-choice
test in a certain way, or carry out a problem set
in a specified manner, you will be credited with
understanding. No one ever asks the further
question ‘But do you really understand?’ because
that would violate an unwritten agreement: a

stand how it works otherwise such a decision would be premature and ill informed.
It appears that many authors of RC-critical
papers have stopped at the first sentence of
this paragraph in their own understanding
of RC, as seems to be the case as evidenced
in the present example.
Once I saw how RC works, I realized
I could use RC because it fits my understanding of how physics (science) is done.
Just as important to me as an instructor,
RC puts the construction of understanding
as central to making sense of phenomena,
and places this construction process in the
“hands” of the students. Whether RC or
not, I think that most thoughtful instructors would agree that only the students can
change their own understanding.
This rush to judgment without actually understanding RC has been evidenced
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is Professor of Physics and Coordinator of Physics Teacher Education in the Physics Department at
Boise State University in Boise, ID. His first disequilibration on the path to RC happened shortly after
he started teaching in 1969. This initial disequilibration was resolved 8 years later when he read
an article on Piaget (Fuller, Karplus & Lawson 1977). Understanding Piaget’s theory of cognitive
equilibration opened the door to radical constructivism. His work as a physicist has engaged
him in studies of how, why and under what circumstances student change their conceptions of
physical phenomena. He has applied conclusions from these studies, testing his understanding
of RC, to the development of an RC-consistent pedagogy and instructional materials.

many times in many venues. It enables rais- experiential world when they realize a dising a collection of arguments against RC equilibration.
that are only valid if one applies to what an
We have used this explanation for
RC writes and says the notion that one can change in understanding to devise instrucindeed know a mind-independent world. tional activities in science and mathematics
Since this notion is the opposite of the cen- that appear to induce this chain of events.
tral distinction RC makes between itself The results are strong evidence that many
and realism, none of the arguments pre- students do construct an alternative explasented can be valid for RC.
nation, which they can use successfully and
Steffe and I are two of the research- which constitute for them a re-equilibration
ers in mathematics and science learning with their expanded experiential world.
who operate from a theory base for how Evidence of this has been presented in this
we understand learning that we have de- commentary.
rived from Piaget and RC. We have seen
This same strategy applied to working
evidence of substantial conceptual change with realists is described near the end of
made by students many
the first section of this
times and we can intercommentary. If we apply
We in RC are not claiming
pret it very well from an
this strategy, born out of
RC- and Piaget-based
RC and Piaget’s idea of
realism applied to
perspective.
cognitive equilibration,
education is incorrect
According to Piaget,
to the challenge of helpbased on observations
ing realists, objectivists,
and RC contributions to
collected by the Center
and materialists undereducation are true
for Genetic Epistemolstand RC, there is some
ogy in Geneva, what we
promise that more will
have come to call “conunderstand RC. In this
ceptual change” begins when a person be- effort we are not trying to prove RC is true
comes aware of a new experience that does and we are not trying to proselytize to swell
not fit their existing mental structures, our rank. Instead we are trying to help oththat is their understanding of their world ers understand RC so they can make honest
of experience. Piaget calls this mismatch judgments about it for their own use.
a “disequilibration.” It is most distinct
Because our RC perspective in learnwhen the person has elicited from herself ing is on understanding, i.e., how, why and
a clear explanation justifying the expecta- under what circumstances it appears to
tion not met by the experience. If allowed change, we have little interest in whether
and encouraged, the person will begin to or not a person can repeat back something
modify and test alternative explanations they have been drilled and practiced at.
to find one that fits the “offending” experi- Drill and practice has an appropriate place
ence. People move to restore equilibration in certain settings, but not when one is fobetween their mental structures and their cused on changes in understanding.

Passages from Slezak’s paper suggest a
meaning for the phrase “good teaching” that
is very consistent with what is called folk
theory teaching. Evaluation of student performance is mostly, if not completely, checking to see if the students can give back in
some appropriate way what was presented.
With this notion of evidence of learning,
there is no doubt that good teaching in this
sense exists.
Research in physics and mathematics
education reveals that responses worthy of
credit in such courses can be generated with
very little change in the understanding required. By the measure of change in understanding, the conclusion is that very little
good teaching exists. Hence, again, using a
realist perspective yields supportable claims,
yet these claims are not applicable to what
we find of value in learning.
The argument that good teaching exists
without RC is based on the initial assumption that we can know a mind-independent
world through our mental efforts. Unfortunately, the initial assumption in RC is
that we cannot know a mind-independent
world; hence the realist claims about good
teaching and that it is not necessary to go
beyond common sense in teaching do not
really carry water from the RC perspective.
We in RC are not claiming realism applied
to education is incorrect and RC contributions to education are true. We merely point
out how RC applied to education works and
what results it gets in education as compared
to realist forms of pedagogy. The evidence is
on the table. It is up to the readers to consider it and act upon their conclusions.
In RC we acknowledge that our starting
assumptions cannot be proven true. Hence,
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we cannot claim that our assumption that a
mind-independent world absolutely cannot
be known (as opposed to such a world not
existing) is true, but we have not yet found
convincing evidence to the contrary. The realist assumption that we can know by dint
of our mental effort a mind-independent
world is their fundamental assumption held
as dear as the contrary is in RC. We see no
convincing evidence in support of the realist’s initial assumption.
It is amply demonstrated in the many
papers and book chapters written against
RC that when one does not use the RC
initial assumption, that we cannot know a
mind-independent world through any mental efforts, then all the rest of RC is based
logically on quicksand. Indeed, one should
not expect otherwise. Just as amply demonstrated by these publications is that many of
the authors apparently do not understand
RC because they show no evidence of being
able to use the initial assumption in RC in
their thinking. If we, as practitioners of RC,
wish to change the situation, change has to
start by helping others to see how using the
RC initial assumption works in interpreting
our experiential worlds.
The process outlined at the end of the
first section of this commentary does not
involve two people debating to win. It is obvious that such a strategy does not make any
significant difference. Instead, the process
outlined is more of an interaction where two
or more people are really striving to understand each other’s ideas instead of proving
each other wrong. In such a context the process described will result in mutual understanding, which in this case means those
who do not already think in terms of the RC
initial assumption come to be able to try this
initial assumption on for size to see how it
works; in other words come to understand
the RC position on the nature of knowledge and how it plays out. Again, this is not
about accepting the RC position, but merely
understanding it. Once RC is understood,
there is no reason to write yet another article proving RC wrong. The effort devoted to
the writing such pieces can be expended in
more useful efforts. To reach this goal, folks
who agree with the RC view have to practice
what they preach, instead of practicing what
realism preaches.
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